investigation, can be instrumental in revealing routes of transmission and guiding infection control responses.
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Introduction
Outbreaks of ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae within neonatal intensive care units are most commonly caused by Klebsiella species and may be associated with significant morbidity and mortality [1] . Klebsiella michiganensis was first identified from a toothbrush holder in a home in Michigan and was initially identified as Klebsiella oxytoca, to which it is closely related (99% nucleotide sequence identity in the 16S rRNA gene sequence) [2] . Since characterization, K. michiganensis has been reported in clinical settings, including as a cause of diarrhea in a hematopoietic stem cell transplant recipient [3] , from a sample of fluid from an abdominal fistula [4] , and in an investigation of hospital-acquired colonization by a New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase-producing organism [5] . While K. oxytoca's role in nosocomial outbreaks is established [6] [7] [8] [9] , there have been no reported outbreaks involving K. michiganensis to date. Similar to K. oxytoca, K. michiganensis carries a chromosomally-encoded OXY-type (Ambler class A) β-lactamase [10, 11] (also labelled as K1 in K. oxytoca the [12] ) which mediates resistance to amino-and carboxy-penicillins (e.g. ampicillin, ticarcillin, temocillin). Over-expression of OXY enzymes arising from mutations in 7 significant proportion of nosocomially-acquired neonatal infections, particularly in developing countries. [20] We describe an outbreak of ESBL-producing K. michiganensis (initially misidentified as K. oxytoca) occurring within a neonatal unit, declared after three apparently unrelated colonized cases were identified. The admissions did not overlap in time and preliminary examination failed to reveal any likely cross contamination events.
We explored the utility of whole genome sequencing (WGS) in conjunction with a standard outbreak investigation to help resolve the source of the outbreak and guide interventions that successfully halted transmission.
Material and methods

Setting
The outbreak investigation was undertaken in a 280 bed regional hospital in South East Queensland, Australia. The Special Care Nursery (SCN) provides care for neonates greater than 32 weeks gestation or a birth weight of 
Definitions, data collection and infection control responses
After declaration of the outbreak, enhanced surveillance was introduced with rectal swabbing of all SCN patients every 48 hours. All neonates with positive screening swabs were isolated in single rooms (when available) and with contact precautions (as per routine policy). Mothers of colonized babies were also screened. Direct observation of IC procedures and hand hygiene performance was performed by independent Hand Hygiene Australia (HHA) accredited IC staff. SCN procedures and policy compliance were reviewed.
Microbial Surveillance
Rectal swabs were collected and plated onto selective chromogenic media (chromID™ ESBL agar; bioMérieux) and examined after 18-24 hours incubation in O 2 . Colonies which grew on selective media were identified by matrix-associated laser desorption/ionization-time-of-flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF) (Vitek MS, bioMérieux) and antibiotic susceptibility determined using the Vitek 2 system (bioMérieux). ESBL production was confirmed using combination disk diffusion, where an increase in the zone of inhibition ≥5mm by the addition of clavulanic acid 
Environmental screening
Swabs were collected from sinks, drains, aerators of faucets, soap dispensers, damp surfaces, high use equipment and the humidification apparatus of humidicribs; and samples of consumables such as shampoo, paraffin and ultrasound gel were collected and plated onto selective chromogenic media and processed in the same way as the patient screening samples (see Microbial surveillance methods).
Whole Genome Sequencing
All K. oxytoca isolates (plus ESBL-producing E. coli), from neonates, their mothers or In brief, raw Illumina sequencing data was quality trimmed using trimmomatic (version 0.36) [22] . In silico sequence typing (ST) was preformed using SRST2 and the K. oxytoca typing scheme available from PubMLST (https://pubmlst.org/). Single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) profiling and determination of core genome SNPs was undertaken by aligning the trimmed Illumina sequencing reads for each sample to the complete genome of M82255 using Nesoni (version 0.132) (https://github.com/Victorian-Bioinformatics-Consortium/nesoni). Resistance gene profiling was performed by screening the trimmed sequence reads for each isolate against the ARG-ANNOT resistance gene database using SRST2 [23] . Only genes with a minimum of 90% nucleotide sequence identity and 90% sequence coverage were reported.
Phylogenetic analysis
A list of polymorphic positions conserved in all strains was established using Nesoni nway. Polymorphic substitution sites were concatenated to produce an alignment that was used to reconstruct the phylogeny. A recombination filtered, Maximum
Likelihood phylogenetic tree was estimated using Gubbins version 2. 
Accession numbers
Genome data has been deposited to NCBI under Bioproject PRJNA512395. Raw Nanopore and Illumina sequence read data has been deposited to the Sequence Read Archive (accessions: SRR89420303-SRR8420330). The complete genome of M82255 has been deposited to GenBank (accessions: CP035214-CP035216)
Ethics
WGS activities for pathogen surveillance and infection control are covered by the Queensland Genomics Health Alliance (QGHA) clinical demonstration project (HREC/17/QFSS/6), with approval for waiver of consent.
Results
Species identification
Initial species characterization, using MALDI-TOF, identified strain M82255 as (Table S1) and similar to K. michiganensis, as M82255 was unable to produce urease [2] confirming the results of the ANI approach. Consequently, M82255 was reclassified as K. michiganensis.
Incident cases
From the incident case to identification of the final case 188 days later, there were ten neonates (and one mother) colonized with K. michiganensis (Figure 1 neonates were also included in the genomic analysis, to determine whether ESBL genes were shared between species. One patient neonatal sample was obtained from another hospital facility following discharge.
Infection Control Observation
Direct observation of the SCN infection control (IC) procedures revealed that all staff hand hygiene (HH) performance was above the national bench-mark (80%).
However, significant opportunities for cross contamination (break down in HH, leaning on equipment, failure to observe contact isolation procedures) were noted in relation to non-staff (e.g. families, friends). Additionally, incomplete compliance with microbial surveillance cultures on admission was noted at the start of the outbreak.
Environmental Screening
Exhaustive screening of the SCN unit on multiple occasions failed to detect a source of environmental contamination. Environmental sampling was then extended to the maternity ward and birth suite. ESBL-producing K. michiganensis was identified from a baby-bath drain in a multi-purpose utility room containing laundry equipment (washing machine and laundry dryer), and a pair of baby baths (no longer used for bathing). However, an epidemiological link between the multi-purpose room in maternity and the colonized cases in SCN was not evident.
During IC unit observation it was noted that the hospital's volunteer flower service used the multi-purpose room for cleaning flower vases. The flower services equipment was then sampled and a second K. michiganensis environmental isolate was retrieved from a sample of the flower service's dishwashing detergent. The hospital's detergent was bought as bulk concentrate and then decanted into reusable detergent bottles for use around the hospital. Each drum of concentrate lasted approximately one month.
K. michiganensis was not identified in the bulk
concentrate at the time of testing, however sampling of detergent from around the hospital identified K. michiganensis from 7 of 13 bottles.
Whole genome sequencing
A total of 27 organisms (16 patient-derived isolates, from 14 individuals and 11 environmental isolates) were included in the genomic analysis ( Table 1 ). This included 21 K. michiganensis and 6 E. coli.
All ESBL-producing K. michiganensis strains were clonally related and belonged to a novel multi-locus sequence type (ST) (Figure 2A) . A single non-ESBL producing K.
oxytoca (M8843) was unrelated to the outbreak and found to belong to the ST50 lineage. All K. michiganensis strains possessed chromosomal OXY-type β-
lactamases, as well as SHV-2 ESBL (in addition to LEN and TEM-1B β-lactamases).
Resistance genes for aminoglycosides (aac3-IId, aph(3')-Ia, strA/B) and sulphonamides (sul1) were also detected.
WGS and an in-depth epidemiological investigation were used to determine if K. michiganensis transmission resulted from direct patient-to-patient transfer or through contact with a common environmental reservoir. Phylogenetically, the K. michiganensis isolates formed two distinct clusters separated by 14 core genome SNPs ( Figure 2B ). Cluster 1 (SCN-C1 from this point on) was composed exclusively of environmental isolates with an overall intra-clade diversity of 0-21 SNPs.
Environmental isolates from baby bath drain 1 (M8848) and isolates collected from 4 of the 8 tested detergent dispensing bottles (M82257, M82624, M82627 and M82628) were identical indicating that contamination during dispensing of the bulk detergent or the drum itself was likely responsible for introducing K. michiganensis into the hospital. Cluster 2 (SCN-C2) was composed of the 10 patient isolates and a single environmental isolate M82256, and similar to SCN-C1, the overall diversity of SCN-C2 was 0-23 SNPs. Isolates from two patients (M8431 and M82629) were identical to the environmental isolate M82256, which was collected from a detergent dispensing bottle located in the SCN milk room.
E. coli strains belonged to ST131, carrying CTX-M-type ESBLs (bla CTX-M-14 and bla CTX-M-27 ) formed 2 clusters within clades A (n=2) and C (n=2) of the global ST131 phylogeny ( Figure S1 ) [27] . clade A isolates (M8845 and M8631) were collected from the same patient (case 7; Table 1 ) and were very closely related (separated by 13 core genome SNPs relative to EC958) suggesting repeated recent exposure to a common source. Two additional but unrelated E. coli isolates, M8842 (ST517) and M8847 (ST1193) were also recovered from patients linked to the outbreak (cases 3 and 9; Table 1 ).
Outbreak Management
All identified cases were isolated under contact precautions. After isolation of K. michiganensis in the multi-purpose room, it was immediately decommissioned and refurbished as a single use facility. Redundant equipment (baby-baths, laundry equipment) was removed and the flower service was temporarily ceased. Reusable detergent bottles from across the hospital were destroyed and the detergent supply switched to pre-filled single use detergent bottles.
As the contamination of the detergent bottles may have originated from contaminated concentrate, a search for similar cases of ESBL-producing K. michiganensis (or K.
oxytoca) at other hospitals served by Pathology Queensland was performed using the statewide laboratory information system, however there was no indication of unrecognized outbreaks at other facilities.
Discussion
Klebsiella species are frequently implicated in outbreaks in the neonatal intensive care setting, although sources are not always evident despite extensive investigation and screening [29] . For example, outbreaks of multi-drug resistant K. oxytoca have been previously linked to environmental reservoirs, with sources described as varied as handwashing sinks [2, 5] , wastewater drainage systems [4] , water humidifiers for neonatal incubators [14] or transducers used for blood pressure monitoring [30] .
Contaminated medical solutions such as heparin [31] , sodium chloride [32] or insulin
[7] have also been described as a source.
Nosocomial outbreaks of K. michiganensis have not been reported previously.
However, based on the average nucleotide identity (ANI) approach [33] , numerous strains previously identified as K. oxytoca have now been reclassified K.
michiganensis, including a carbapenem resistant strain, E718 (GenBank accession: CP003683), isolated from the abdomen of a renal transplant patient [34] . In fact, of the seven complete K. michiganesis genomes on GenBank, including M82255 from the outbreak described here, all were originally classified as K. oxytoca.
Consequently, it is possible that hospital outbreaks of K. michiganensis may go undetected as they are prone to misclassification.
Contaminated disinfectant has previously been recognized as a potential source of K.
oxytoca sepsis in hospitalized infants [35] . Organism factors such as a mucoid phenotype via enhanced capsule formation may enable the bacteria to survive in this environment [35] . Additionally, it has been suggested that in Klebsiella, outermembrane proteins, such as peptidoglycan-associated lipoprotein (Pal) and murein lipoprotein (LppA), contribute to resistance against detergents through modulating the integrity and selective impermeability of the cell membrane independently of LPS and capsule [36] . A contaminated washing machine has also been implicated as a source of an ESBL-producing K. oxytoca outbreak in newborns [37] . Strains of K.
oxytoca which are able to withstand active ingredients of commonly-used detergents, such as sodium dodecyl sulfate (SDS), have been described [38] .
This report clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of high-throughput WGS as a tool Although the initial source of the contamination could not be confirmed, K.
michiganensis isolates related to the outbreak were identified in liquid detergent dispensers located at different sites throughout the hospital. Liquid detergent dispensers are refilled from a central bulk drum of detergent concentrate. However, at the time of the outbreak the bulk concentrate was negative for K. michiganensis. It is possible that either a contaminated drum was introduced into the hospital, its contents dispensed and the drum disposed of prior to the outbreak or contamination occurred at some point during the dispensing process.
In addition to K. michiganensis, 6 ESBL-producing E. coli isolates were recovered from the local environment and from patients admitted to the SCN over the course of the outbreak. Although 4 of the 5 E. coli were clonally related (ST131) samples collected from different patients were sufficiently diverged to rule out any patient-topatient transmission.
Conclusions
Environmental reservoirs are increasingly recognized as a source of outbreaks involving MDR pathogens. We demonstrate how whole genome sequencing, in conjunction with standard epidemiological investigation, was instrumental in elucidating the source of ESBL-producing K. michiganensis in a neonatal unit and directing effective measures to interrupt transmission. Liquid detergent can become contaminated with pathogenic bacteria and should be considered as a potential source in such outbreaks.
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